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Abstract
This paper examines the remarkable and unexplored correspondence between games 
(and board games in particular) and what is commonly understood as theory in the social 
sciences.  It argues that games exhibit many if not most of the attributes of theory, but that 
theory is missing some of the features of games.  As such, game provide a way of rethinking 
what we mean by theory and theorizing.  Specifically, games and their relationship with the 
‘real’ world, provide a way of thinking about theory and theorizing that is consistent with 
recent calls to frame social inquiry around the concept of phrónēsis.  
1.	
 Throw a six to start
This paper examines the unexplored correspondence between games (and board games 
in particular) and what is commonly understood as theory in the social sciences. The purpose 
of the paper is simply to better understand what we mean by theory, by looking at theory 
through a game lens, and by comparing and contrasting the two phenomena of games and 
theory. In addition, given that ‘theory’ is a contested term, one goal of our inquiry is to see 
what a game lens might bring to debates about what theory is and is not, and how it might 
provide guidance for those who are confused about how to progress and unclear about what 
constitutes a theoretical contribution. A secondary question is centred on what we might learn 
about games and play through contrasting and comparing games with theory.In the next 
section of the paper we briefly review the literatures on the nature of theory and the nature of 
games.  While there are long-standing debates about the meaning of the word ‘theory’, the 
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literature on games and gaming is a more recent phenomenon.  There is a somewhat older 
literature on play, though because play is such a ‘fat’ word, replete with so many different 
meanings, we focus on games and board games in particular.  Having grounded, as much as 
we can, the two main concepts, we then proceed to compare and contrast one with the other. 
This we do in two stages.   First, we look at games through a theory lens, asking, ‘If theory 
and theorizing are ‘X’, to what extent are games a form (and not a form) of theory?’. In short, 
the answer is that games exhibit most if not all of the attributes of theory.   In the second step, 
consider the opposite  question: ‘How can a game perspective advance our understanding of 
the theory and theorizing and clarify what constitutes a theoretical contribution in the social 
sciences?’.  This exercise in comparing and contrasting theory leads, ultimately, to 
recognising the importance of phrónēsis in games, and its relatively marginal position (up 
until recently) in theory and theorizing.  This we discuss in the concluding section of the 
paper.  
2. 	
 What is theory? What is a game?
In this section we will briefly review two quite distinct literatures: one that inquires into 
the question, ‘What is theory’ and another that asks, ‘What are games?’ We will consider each 
in turn.
The paradox of theory in the social sciences is that while the term is seen as 
fundamental, an accepted meaning of the word is elusive. Merton’s (1967: 39) concerns are 
typical: ‘Because its referents are so diverse’ he suggests, ‘including everything from minor 
working hypothesis, through comprehensive but vague and unordered speculations, to 
axiomatic systems of thought – use of the word often obscures rather than creates 
understanding.’ Sutton and Staw (1995: 371) echo these sentiments, observing that ‘there is 
lack of agreement about whether a model and a theory can be distinguished, whether a 
typology is properly labeled a theory or not, whether the strength of a theory depends on how 
interesting it is, and whether falsifiability is a prerequisite for the very existence of a theory’. 
For them, the ‘lack of consensus on exactly what theory is may explain why it is so difficult 
to develop strong theory in the behavioral sciences’ (Sutton and Staw, 1995: 372). Corvellec 
(2013: 14) disagrees, arguing that ‘lack of consensus on what theory is itself explains why it 
is possible to develop strong theory in the social and cultural sciences’. For Weick (1995: 
385), ‘products of the theorizing process seldom emerge as full-blown theories, which means 
that most of what passes for theory in organizational studies consists of approximations’. 
Instead of theory as a product, he suggests, the focus should be on theorizing as a process. To 
add to the complexity, people may subscribe to a theory in practice independently of whether 
its principles have been observed or described. For instance, when Hornick articulated the 
principles of a mercantilist theory in 1684 he merely proposed – for Austrian national policy 
– what had long been established in many countries as a normative pattern of behaviour. 
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Notwithstanding this complexity, social scientists are routinely concerned with what theory is 
and is not, what constitutes a theoretical contribution, and how the practice of theorising 
should be done. 
Such conversations have a particular tenor in management and organization studies 
probably because these disciplines trace their roots to the 1950s when there was a rampant 
fetish for formal theory across the social sciences (Hage, 1994).1   Even though the two 
disciplines imbibed at the antipositivist well from the 1980s onwards, a rather positivist 
understanding of theory and theorizing is still ‘hard-wired’ into their disciplinary DNA as 
demonstrated by the papers published in the higher ranked journals in management and 
organisation studies. Yet, debates about what theory is, and is not, continue. For instance, the 
Academy of Management Review produced a highly cited special issue on the subject in 1989 
(volume 14, issue 4), with Administrative Science Quarterly following suit in 1995 (volume 
40, issue 3). Much of the debate is centred on the distinctive nature and merits of two 
dominant paradigms of inquiry, positivism and interpretativism, and on whether these 
paradigms are commensurable with one another or not. 
Bacharach (1989: 496) broadly defines a theory as a ‘statement of relations among 
concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints’. For the purpose of making 
more detailed comparisons here, we adopt that set of characteristics of ‘good’ theory, or 
theorizing, proposed in Wacker’s (1998) definition, along with elements suggested by Weick 
and others. Thus, we find, the heart of any theory is some set of ideas or ‘constructs’, 
typically representing or approximating ‘phenomena’ drawn from the ‘real’ world. Wacker 
(1998: 361) describes these as ‘conceptual definitions’, while to Whetten they are ‘factors’ or 
‘variables’ (1989: 490). Most writers include the necessity for ‘boundary assumptions’, or 
what Wacker refers to as ‘domain limitations’ (1998: 361). Another essential element of any 
theory is that these ideas, factors, phenomena, constructs or variables (call them what you 
will) are arranged in a set of ‘relationships’ that are meaningful or logical. ‘Theory is about 
the connections among phenomena […] Theory emphasizes the nature of causal 
relationships’ (Sutton and Staw, 1995: 378). Following Sutton and Staw, we acknowledge that 
a good theory is not the sum of its typical individual components and agree with Weick’s 
(1995) view that theories are dynamic, and that theorizing is a process rather than a product. 
‘Perhaps’, Weick suggests, ‘the ultimate tradeoff is the one between process and product, 
between theorizing and theory, between doing it and freezing it’ (Weick, 1995: 390). Wacker 
and others include making predictions in the ‘definitional criteria’ (1998: 367), though the 
broader discussion contains differences of emphasis and interpretation about how the 
predictive power of a theory can be tested. The quality of offering predictive power—or of 
Theory games	
 3
3
1 Interestingly, formal theory became popular partly because of the keen interest in computer (and mathematical) simulation 
due to the advent of computing technologies around that time, and in this sense, computers has affected our understanding of 
what theory is.  However,  computers have also affected our understanding of what a game is, in so far as video games, 
which are built on computing technology, have redefined the game concept.
enabling inferences to be drawn—implies a corresponding potential for testing and 
falsifiability. Wacker refers to the criterion (for ‘good’ theory) of ‘empirical riskiness’ (1998: 
366) which in essence means the degree to which a theory may be exposed to the possibility 
of refutation.
Beyond these basic and generally agreed criteria a few other themes are regularly 
referenced, under a variety of labels. Perhaps the most important of these is the requirement 
for a theory to provide a causal explanation, or explicatory narrative, for the phenomena 
within its domain. Weick refers to this virtue of a theory as its being ‘believable’ or having 
‘verisimilitude’ (1989: 527) probably in the same sense as Sutton and Staw use ‘convincing 
and logically interconnected’ (1995: 378). There is also an expectation that a theory should 
avoid having too narrow a domain of application. Wacker refers to this as the virtue of 
‘generalizability’ (1998: 365) but it appears in other discussions as ‘utility’, usefulness or 
‘scope’ (Bacharach, 1989: 506), and is a concept deeply entwined with a theory’s explanatory 
or predictive power. Finally we may distinguish a theme that runs through a number of 
accounts as the ‘aesthetic’ qualities of a theory, or what Weick calls the ‘beautiful’ (1989: 
527).
This necessarily brief review of the literature on theory suggests how difficult it is 
simply to list the elements of an essentially dynamic activity like theorizing. However, if we 
are to compare and contrast theories and game design, it is helpful to have such a simplified 
list for reference. Before compiling this, we move now to briefly review the literature on 
games and begin by looking at play.
In a seminal book, Huizinga (1955) argued that play is elementary to the human 
condition, and that war, religion, sports and the arts are all forms of play. ‘Play’, he asserted, 
‘cannot be denied. You can deny, if you like, nearly all abstractions: justice, beauty, truth, 
goodness, mind, God. You can deny seriousness, but not play’ (1955: 3). If the literature on 
play and games was tiny before Huizinga, it is now burgeoning, which is perhaps not 
surprising since both concepts encompass such a wide range of phenomena: an infant plays 
with a toy, a woman plays a musical instrument, an audience watches a play in a theatre, a 
corporation’s stock goes into play, while a professional footballer’s work is to play. Play is of 
particular interest in management studies, not least because management has traditionally 
focused on play’s presumed opposite – work – and, more recently, because play is seen as an 
intrinsic part of learning and creativity (Kavanagh, 2011). Game is perhaps a more bounded 
concept than play. This boundary can be traced using Caillois’ classification of four forms of 
play – agon (competition), alea (chance), mimicry (simulation) and ilinx (vertigo). Games fit 
easily into the first two forms (sports and games of chance), and not well into the last (ilinx 
refers to forms of play involving dizziness or quick changes of movement). The third form, 
mimicry, refers to phenomena like the carnival and theatre and, it can be argued, that the 
‘conceit’ or ‘theme’ that engages the imagination of the players, even encouraging them to sit 
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down to play, represents a theatricality, or imaginative simulation. To support this idea 
consider recent developments in role playing games, or the relationship between board games 
and cinema, where games are designed to allow players to adopt characters and mimic 
situations within the universe created by a movie.
The concept of game encompasses a wide variety of activities: children’s games like 
hide-and-seek, thousands of different card games, an even more eclectic collection of board 
games (over 60,000 games are listed on the website boardgamegeek.com), a massive video 
game industry (estimated revenues of $78.5 billion in 2012 (Nayak and Baker, 2012) and 
field games like football, tennis, hurling and hockey. More broadly, many social activities can 
be interpreted as games. For instance, some have argued that business is just a game, akin to a 
game of poker, with its own rules and practices (Carr, 1968; Stack and Burlingham, 1992), 
while others have highlighted that people, including managers, are continually playing 
psychological games in their interactions with others (Berne, 1964; Weber, 1989).  Most 
obviously, asset markets display many, if not all, of the attributes of games, though 
Hamington (2009) sees this as a case of taking a metaphor too far. Interestingly, Hamington’s 
concern is that social activity, once perceived as a game, may be trivialized, its adversarial 
character may be exaggerated, and ethical behaviour may be truncated, though this concern 
may be unjustified because unethical behaviour, aggression and breaking of rules is frowned 
on in game play as much as in any other human activity. It is highly likely that rule breakers 
and misbehavers derive their guiding light from personal psychology and previous 
experience, rather than from any lack of appreciation for the social importance of their 
current activity.
To add to the complexity, an activity may be classified as a ‘game’ in one context, while 
an almost identical activity is ‘not a game’ in another context. For example, clay pigeon 
shooting is a game, while military sharp shooting is not. We trust that there was a difference 
of intellectual engagement between moving wooden blocks on a map in war games at an 
officer training exercise and on the same map some miles behind the front line at the Somme. 
The US military were quick to recognize the value of game playing to ‘teach everything from 
doctrine, to strategy and tactics’ (Prensky, 2003: 3). The website ‘Social Impact Games’ 
catalogues ‘Entertaining Games with Non-Entertainment Goals (a.k.a. Serious Games)2’. For 
example, one of these games, 3rd World Farmer, is a student project that ‘challenges players 
to keep themselves and their families alive while managing a farm in poverty and conflict-
stricken Africa’:
So, how do you win at 3rd World Farmer? 
You don't. Eventually, the yearly hardships and frequent agricultural, economic, and civil 
disasters will wipe out your entire family. It's not fair and it's not fun but perhaps that is the 
point. “We aim at making the player 'experience' the injustices, rather than being told 
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2 http://www.socialimpactgames.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=index&catid=13&topic=&allstories=1
about them, so as to stimulate a deeper and more personal reflection on the 
topics,” [original emphasis].3
In short, context matters. Indeed Wittgenstein (1953) saw that context was vital, not only 
for games but also for language, and it was this insight that formed the basis for his important 
concept of language-games. Languages, for Wittgenstein, are analogous to games; for him, 
saying something in a language is like making a move in a game. 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: 
"There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and 
see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them 
at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with their 
multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences 
with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass 
next to ballgames, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all 
'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and 
losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning 
and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has 
disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill 
in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the 
element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And 
we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how 
similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail (Wittgenstein, 1953: 31).
It is perhaps this curious mixture of similarity and difference that provides the basis for 
the growing literature of ludology, or game studies, and it is to this literature that we now turn 
as we continue our inquiry into the relationship between theory and games.  Our interest is 
much the same as Wittgenstein’s: ‘How should we explain to someone what a game is? I 
imagine that we should describe games to him, and we might add: “This and similar things 
are called ‘games’”’ (1953: 33). We must try to address this if we are to consider the 
relationship between theories and games.
Even though the ludology literature can trace its roots to early studies by Culin (1889; 
1895; 1907) in the late 19th century, and the seminal works of Huizinga (1955) and Caillois 
(1961), it is very much a recent phenomenon with almost all academic journals appearing 
since 2000: Game Studies (2001), Game Developer (2001), Gaming Research & Review 
Journal (2002), Games & Culture (2006), and Eludamos: Journal for Computer Game 
Culture (2007). Similarly, the growing collection of books on games includes very few books 
published before 2000. One of the most comprehensive is The Art of Game Design: A Book of 
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Lenses by Jesse Schell (2008), CEO of Pittsburgh’s largest video game studio, a professor at 
Carnegie Mellon’s Entertainment Technology Centre, and former Creative Director at 
Disney’s Imagineering Virtual Reality Studio. His book is a rich and insightful exploration of 
game design, particularly of video games. in which he presents a 32-item frame and 100 
different lenses that game designers might use to scrutinize different aspects of their practice. 
Like many others, Schell sees a commonality across all types of games: 
Video games are just a natural growth of traditional games into a new medium. The rules 
that govern them are still the same. An architect must understand how to design a shed 
before he can design a skyscraper, and so we will often be studying some of the very 
simplest games. Some of these will be videogames, but some will be far simpler: Dice 
games. Card games. Board games. Playground games. If we cannot understand the 
principles of these games, how can we hope of understanding more complex games? Some 
will argue that these games are old, and therefore not worth studying, but as Thoreau said, 
“We might as well omit to study Nature because she is old.”  A game is a game is a game. 
(Schell, 2008: xxvi)
Other valuable and influential studies of games include Half-real: Video games between 
real rules and fictional worlds (Juul, 2005), Games without Frontiers: Methods for Game 
Studies and Design (Järvinen, 2009), Eurogames: The Design, Culture and Play of Modern 
European Board Games (Woods, 2012), Characteristics of Games (Elias et al., 2012) and The 
game design reader: a rules of play anthology (Salen and Zimmerman, 2006). These are the 
primary texts consulted in seeking an answer to our question, ‘What is a game?’ or rather 
‘What are the characteristics of a game?’. Having then, rather briefly, considered these two 
quite different literatures: one that looks at what theory and theorizing is, and one that 
considers the nature of games, we have identified seven elements that appear to be common 
to (good) theories and ten elements of (good) games, which we set out in Table 1. 
-----------------------
Insert Table 1 here
-----------------------
3. 	
 Playing with games
The previous section sought to ground, as far as possible, our understanding of games 
and theory. In this and the next section we examine the correspondences and differences 
between the two phenomena. 
A useful starting point is to suggest that the criteria identified in the literature as 
axiomatic to any theory – conceptual definitions, domain limitations, relationship-building, 
and predictions (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Wacker, 1998) – are manifest in games. Most 
obviously, games have conceptual definitions set out in the rules of play and concepts tend to 
be quite precisely defined in games. Likewise, games have relatively exact domain limits 
specified by the rules. The focus on relationship-building draws on the ideas of formal theory 
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that were especially popular in the 1960s, the notion being that a theory is an explanatory 
model of the world framed around a network of relationships between a parsimonious set of 
constructs. Akin to theories, games also consist of a network of relationships between 
constructs, again as set out in the rules of play. For instance, in Monopoly, a ‘player’ can only 
‘build a house’ if the player ‘owns’ a ‘set’ of ‘streets’. Players and observers can also infer 
relationships between constructs; again using Monopoly as an example, players will place a 
higher premium on the orange set of streets on the basis that players leaving ‘jail’ are more 
likely to land on these streets, or they might inductively develop a sense of the relationship 
between investment and cash flow through repeatedly playing the game. Note that these can 
be considered as emergent phenomena since they are not explicit in the rule book or often not 
envisaged by it. Players may use this acquired knowledge through playing to make 
predictions – one of the basic criteria of theory building – about what will happen in the 
future: for example, ‘Mary will win because she has built a hotel before anyone else has built 
even a house’. Moreover, players will develop many local interpretations and predictions - 
‘Johnny [the novice] will make a foolish decision in negotiating with Michael [the expert]’ – 
which, taken together, can be understood as collective and individual attempts to explain and 
predict success in the game. 
In considering the basic criteria – T1 to T4 in Table 1 – it appears that games do meet the 
requirements of what constitutes theory, or, at the very least, that theorizing is practiced and 
present in games. 
Some might suggest that the level of theorizing in games is relatively unsophisticated, 
even trivial, because the domain appears to be so limited. However, there are a number of 
counter-arguments to this view. First, games deeply engage not only players but also 
spectators who can spend considerable effort and mental energy analysing individual games 
and players, explaining why a player or team consistently wins or loses, and predicting the 
result of the next game. As Liedman (2013: 25) suggests, we may understand theorizing to be 
‘beholding, explaining, and predicting’.  Second, the argument may have merit for some very 
simple games, but many games, and probably the majority of recently designed games, have 
complex and rich social settings. In fact any game designer who is successful must have 
developed a set of rules that captures the imagination of players – before, during, and after 
reflection on their game experience – to the extent that it represents a world that they 
recognise, that simulates some believable phenomena, and that retains balance and equity 
between the players in practice. Third, theorizing always abbreviates and simplifies – ‘A good 
theory is, by definition, a limited and fairly precise picture’ (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989: 
562) – and hence theories about games are probably no more of a simplification than theories 
in other domains. Fourth, depicting games as trivial might be better understood as simple 
antipathy towards recreation and play, which we might attribute to enduring Puritan values in 
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(American) society – and management studies in particular – as much as anything else 
(Kavanagh, 2011).  
We can distinguish four different but interlinked domains of theorizing in games: theory 
in design; theory in play; theory in spectating; and theory between games. Theory in design is 
the theorizing that a game designer engages in while conceiving, developing and play-testing 
a game’s laws and components, and is the main line of comparison with theory development 
in this paper, though we acknowledge that the boundary between the design of a game and 
the playing of a game is a soft one, frequently traversed in both directions. However, it builds 
on the core distinction between the game designer and the game player (Schell, 2008) and 
thus may approximate the distinction between the development of a theory in the social 
sciences and its application. Theory in play describes the theorizing that a player (agent) 
engages in during actual play. This theorizing is part of the practice of play and will involve a 
mix of general models of the world – “always try to acquire the orange streets in Monopoly” 
– and more idiosyncratic, even political, responses – “if Michael gets what he wants in this 
turn he’ll probably win the game”. Theory in play is framed within the structure of the game, 
and so is linked to theory in design in much the same way that agency and structure are 
linked to one another in the social world: individuals have some capacity to act 
independently, but these actions also work to create the recurrent patterns (structure) that 
limit future choices and opportunities (Giddens, 1984). The difference between the game 
designer and player (and consequently the difference between theory in design and theory in 
play) also mirrors Saussure’s (1916/1983) distinction between langue and parole: langue 
being the abstract, systematic rules of a signifying system or language, independent of 
individual users, while parole refers to concrete instances of the use of langue in speech acts. 
In game design, there is a presumption that structure (the system) is largely the creation of the 
game designer, in contrast to language and broader social systems where structure is seen as 
more emergent. This is a point worthy of future exploration, since the literature on game 
design includes two important post design (emergent in play) characteristics: politics, where 
‘players can target other players in an arbitrary way’ (Elias et al., 2012: 50) and ‘griefing’ 
which encompasses a broad set of ‘misbehaviours’ (within the game universe) like biased 
trading, blocking other players, exploiting known rules loopholes, aggressive tactics, or 
straightforward obscenity (Schell, 2008: 369). 
Theory in spectating characterises the theorizing that spectators and observers engage in 
during and outside of play. Spectators are precluded from playing (though players can 
spectate), but they can still be an important part of game-playing. And for us they are 
especially important, because the etymology of the word theory can be traced to the Greek 
word theōros, meaning ‘spectator’. While players can act on theories during play, spectators 
have limited ability to influence play as it happens (which, of course, might explain why they 
can get so agitated).  
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Finally, there is theory between games, which is the type of theorizing that occurs when 
one game is used to make sense of another game. For instance, one might see and use 
parallels between the game of Monopoly and the practice of building a ‘real’ property empire. 
In contrast to the first three types, which are centred around an individual game, this form of 
theorizing connects different games, although ‘games’ in this context might be better 
understood as systems (in Luhman’s (1995) understanding of that term). What this points to is 
that the common understanding of theory as a ‘model of the world’ warrants unpicking, in so 
far as the ‘world’ may be the game itself or include other games.
While these four domains of theorizing are distinct, they are also linked to one another. 
For instance, a game designer will develop expertise in game design through experience of 
being a player and of watching games being played. Likewise, the player’s ability to construct 
good theory is based on repeated play as well as spectating.
4.	
 Playing with theory
Thus far, we have looked at games through a theory lens, asking if games demonstrate 
the attributes of what we understand as theory. Broadly speaking, it appears as if the answer 
is, ‘Yes’.  We will now look at theories through a games lens, asking if theories demonstrate 
the attributes of what we understand as games. This is the perspective that we will take in the 
remainder of this section. In doing so, we will consider the ten elements of games we 
identified in Table 1 and use these to think about theories, and, in particular, how a games 
perspective might illuminate what might be missing from the conventional understanding of 
theory. One rough and ready way of doing this is to experiment by replacing the word 
‘games’ in our ten elements of games with the word ‘theories’ and reflect on what new 
insights this might give into the nature of theories and theorizing.4  Of necessity due to space 
constraints, our purpose here is to merely indicate new perspectives on theory and potential 
directions for future inquiry.
1.	
 Theories are epistemologically beyond the compass of lists and definitions and can only 
be properly known through playing. This assertion is consistent with the literature which has 
never converged on an agreed understanding of what theory is, or is not. We do not know 
what a theory is because a theory cannot be defined or captured by a list of attributes; a theory 
is not the sum of those attributes. What a games perspective suggests is that theories must be 
used and can only be properly known through use. We might compare theories to 
Wittgenstein’s portrayal of language games as a ‘blurred concept’:
Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the 
indistinct one often exactly what we need? […] One gives examples and intends them to be 
taken in a particular way.—I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in 
those examples that common thing which I—for some reason—was unable to express; but 
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4 When we use the word ‘theories’, we are also including the practice of theorizing. 
that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not 
an indirect means of explaining—in default of a better. […] The point is that this is how we 
play the game (Wittgenstein, 1953: 34, our emphasis).
At best, then, we may point to some aspect of a theory and say ‘this seems good’ or ‘that 
seems to work’.  It may be the case that our judgment of any theory as good depends on its 
having referents, or examples of similar theories to point to. Good theories thus offer 
examples of good theory. A possible danger here is that this process may become self 
referential and circular, and subject to fashion and taste. In this way new approaches to 
theorising, having no reference points, may be dismissed and consequently the discipline may 
resist novelty.
2.	
 Theories emotionally engage players, giving them a meaningful experience and 
opportunity to express themselves. Some theories do engage people – Marxism comes to 
mind – but our sense is that typically people are not emotionally engaged by theories, at least 
not in the way that games do.  For instance, Flyvbjerg records that when he asked Stuart 
Dreyfus ‘where in the body a chess player feels that a move is right, he told me, “in the whole 
body. In the pit of the stomach”’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 15).  Similarly, Kahneman has identified 
this ‘gut’ feeling as an ability of the ‘expert’ chess player, since ‘by the time chess players 
become experts they have “seen everything”  (or almost everything)’ (Kahneman, 2011: 241–
2). Nevertheless, implicit in all accounts and explicit in some, is an expectation that a ‘good’ 
or a ‘strong’ theory will engage the human imagination. In a discussion of what a theory of 
creativity might require, Amabile (1993: 181) suggests that theories should be ‘judged on 
their “intellectual excitement”  value’. Likewise, there’s is much insight in Astley’s (1985: 
504) comment that “old paradigms fall from grace not because they are wrong but because 
they are boring”.  The lesson, perhaps, is that we need to be more explicit about the need for 
theories to emotionally engage us.  
3.	
 Theories have procedures and rules. Here, our earlier distinction between theory in 
design and theory in play is relevant. Does theory development have procedures and rules, or 
does a theory itself consist of a set of procedures and rules provided to its agents, which must 
then be observed by these ‘players’? 
4.	
 Theories have a material technology, which may include components like plastic tokens, 
boards, dice, pens and cards.  Much the same point has been made by sociologists of science 
like Ian Hacking who argues that “as a laboratory science matures, it develops a body of 
types of theory and types of apparatus and types of analysis that are mutually adjusted to one 
another”  (Hacking, 1992: 30).  For Hacking, theories “are self-vindicating in the sense that 
any test of theory is against apparatus that has evolved in conjunction with it – and in 
conjunction with modes of data analysis”  (ibid.).  Outside of the laboratories, the wide use of 
data in theorizing, and in applying theory, involves the use of current computing 
technologies, as well as older technologies and ‘player aids’ like charts, diagrams and maps. 
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Thus a game lens shifts attention to what Hacking (1992: 32) refers to as the ‘matérial of the 
experiment’ which is largely invisible in discussions about the nature of theory in the social 
sciences. 
5.	
 Theories have an aesthetic, which is every thing to do with how the theory looks, sounds, 
feels and plays. Weick argues that the excessive constraints of methodology (or craft) may 
weaken the act of theorizing ‘because they de-emphasize the contribution that imagination, 
representation, and selection make to the process, and they diminish the importance of 
alternative theorizing activities such as mapping, conceptual development, and speculative 
thought’ (Weick, 1989: 516). He suggests that a theory is judged of higher quality if it is, inter 
alia, ‘aesthetically pleasing’ (1989: 517).  In Kantian terms we can ‘observe a purposiveness 
according to form, without basing it on a purpose’; in other words, we can appreciate that an 
aesthetic artefact (or a game, or a theory) has a ‘purposiveness’ without being able to 
articulate this purpose precisely (Kant, 1790/2007: 41).
6.	
 Theories are structured around a problem or goal that challenges the players through a 
structure of rewards and penalties. Like Wittgenstein, MacIntyre (1981/1984) uses games to 
make an important theoretical contribution, this time in his influential distinction between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ goods, which he explains by telling a story of an adult encouraging a 
child to play the game of chess.  Initially, the adult offers the child a tangible reward, such as 
sweets, if she plays the game, but over time the child comes to enjoy playing and will play 
solely for the love of playing, regardless of the reward.  For MacIntyre, the ‘internal good’ is 
the enjoyment derived from playing the game while the sweets constitute the ‘external good’. 
An internal good (or reward) for a theorist might be considered as the deep personal 
satisfaction to be derived from engaging in a practice which she considers to have ethical 
substance, and which has the potential, at least, to offer a social benefit. This contrasts with 
external goods, where the pursuit of an activity like theory building is aimed at achieving 
institutionally determined goals, like career advancement, or peer regard. ‘Research 
Assessment Exercises, which are created and maintained by the institution rather than the 
practice, are a good example of an external good’ (Kavanagh, 2013: 107). 
	
 A theory game that turns out, on empirical testing, to be wrong may have serious, even 
catastrophic, consequences for its proponents and agents (or ‘players’) in the real world. For 
the theorist, however, even incorrect theories may still provide an external good, merely 
through the action of research assessment metrics and institutional rewards. It is difficult to 
argue that history has penalised theory designers since, as Taleb has accurately observed of 
economists, ‘the problem with the economic establishment is that they are never harmed by 
their bad models’5.
7.	
 Theories feature chance or risk as an intrinsic element.   
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A few games, such as chess, have no hidden information and no random element to affect a 
player’s next move; nothing in chess is determined by the roll of a die or the turning of a 
card. Other games do have random elements (see Malaby (2007) for a good discussion on 
different forms of contingency or chance in games), and so do many activities in life, the very 
subjects of our theorizing. We may feel in our gut, based on a lifetime’s experience, that a 
theory is valid. Detailed calculations of the probability of outcomes based on historic data 
may support our gut feeling, but these are calculations based on risk factors whose inclusion 
or exclusion is often guided by the same gut feeling. To compound the problem, an outcome 
may be subject to uncertainty as Keynes means that term:
The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is 
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the 
obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social 
system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. (Keynes in Skidelsky, 2009: 84) 
We might conclude then that chance, as an inescapable feature of the real world, is also 
an inescapable element in the beholding the real world, and informing our theories about it. 
What expert players do, in games where chance plays a significant part, is adopt strategies 
that minimise or distribute its effects. But it is impossible, in the course of a single life, to 
‘see everything’, or much of anything, and yet we must contemplate, identify useful 
constructs, and attempt to build theories. This has an important bearing on the question of 
validating theory through experience. Validating may be feasible in play testing a board game 
where the variables are limited and events can be replicated, but is far less so in the real world 
due to an almost unlimited number of variables and a lack of control over our environment.
If chance is an integral parts of games (see Malaby (2007) for a good discussion on 
different forms of chance and contingency in games) it is treated rather differently in social 
theory.  In the interpretative tradition, chance is typically ignored or substituted by an appeal 
to context.  In contrast, positivist research is premised on the notion that chance plays an 
insignificant role in much of the world (and hence ‘statistically significant’ relationships can 
be mapped).  A games perspective problematises each of these positions, especially if we 
accept Kahneman’s (2011: 14) assertion that, ‘We are prone to overestimate how much we 
understand about the world and to underestimate the role of chance in events’.  
8.	
 Theories generate stories, that have characters, action, plots and other narrative and 
theatrical elements. A good theory provides us with a ‘meaningful’ narrative, or plot, with an 
overtly causal relationship between the plot points. In the first instance this ‘plot’ explains the 
phenomena we observe, and further suggests ways in which the plot can be shaped and 
directed, by our emphasising or selecting particular lines from the narrative. The theory thus 
builds on the story it tells to suggest an improved narrative.
9.	
 Theories have an ethic. It is perhaps surprising that the word ‘ethics’ does not appear in 
any of the main sources we consulted in defining a theory’s characteristics.   Indeed Ghoshal 
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(2005: 77) has suggested that ‘a precondition for making business studies a science has been 
the denial of any moral or ethical considerations in our theories’.  If this is true, then we must 
wonder at what point this amoral interpretation of scientific method became manifest. We 
might begin by laying the charge at the eponymous character in Machiavelli’s how-to manual 
of statecraft – presented to generations of business students and CEOs – who is manipulative, 
calculating and self-serving to the extent that ‘Machiavellian’ became a byword for immoral 
political behaviour6. It is of interest to compare this with the theory expressed in the game of 
Monopoly where ‘each player takes on the role of a cheerfully rapacious real-estate tycoon, 
wheeling and dealing until he alone commands the board’ (Jackson quoted in Peterson, 2012: 
xiii), but we do not expect players leaving the game to adopt this role as a model for their 
general behaviour. Perhaps the ethics proposed for the Prince by Machiavelli are a reflection 
of his time and place, since Rennaissance leaders did not aspire to be democrats. Though the 
Greeks gave us the word democracy it is clear that they did not interpret the word according 
to our current sense. ‘The views of Aristotle on ethics represent, in the main, the prevailing 
opinions of educated and experienced men of his day’ (Russell, 1945/2004: 168). Aristotle 
was human and yet, in his world view, theorizing or ‘contemplation in itself was not human; 
it was divine’ (Liedman, 2013: 26). In this case Ghoshal may be only half right. The practice 
of theorizing may actually be beyond ethical considerations – it is disinterested, or impartial 
(or divine) – but the theory itself, and its agents, exist within a human, ethical framework. 
10.	
 Theories are formal systems, relatively separate from the ‘external’ world. This last 
element warrants careful consideration, since this may be the most relevant of the commonly 
preceived distinctions between games and theory games. However, before testing its 
relevance to theorizing, it is important to see how completely it describes games. In the play 
literature, there is a long-standing view that play is an ‘autotelic’ activity, meaning that the 
direction of behaviour is completely inward, onto the very essence of the activity itself. By 
definition, an autotelic activity is engaged in solely for its own sake, with no meaning exterior 
to itself or ulterior motive outside of its own terms of reference. This idea goes back to 
Huizinga (1955) who saw play as ‘an act apart’, separated by a ‘magic circle’ from ‘ordinary 
life’ (1955: 10, 13) and Caillois (1961: 10) who saw games as ‘separate’. Likewise, in an 
early and important contribution to the computer games literature, Crawford (1984: 7) 
asserted that ‘a game is a closed formal system that subjectively represents a subset of 
reality… By “closed”  I mean that the game is complete and self sufficient as a structure. The 
model world created by the game is internally complete; no reference need be made to agents 
outside of the game’ and indeed Schell (2008: 34) also sees a game as a ‘closed formal 
system’. Others disagree. For instance, Juul (2005: 36) sees the boundaries between the game 
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6 However The Prince can be construed at different levels, and Machiavelli may have been engaged in multiple projects, one 
of them deeply satirical and one even a primer for republicans designed, as Dietz (1986: 777) asserts, ‘to undo Lorenzo de 
Medici by giving him advice that would jeopardize his power’.
and real worlds as ‘fuzzy areas under constant negotiation’, while Woods argues that ‘a 
particular game can offer a vastly different experience depending upon the context in which it 
is played’ and that ‘board game systems are anything but closed’ (2012: 6). Malaby (2007: 
96) also holds this view, noting that, ‘Ironically, it is how we have sought to account for what 
is remarkable about games by setting them apart (as play-spaces, as stories) that is the largest 
roadblock to understanding what is powerful about them’. In this debate, we side with 
Woods, Juul and Malaby, which is why we say that games are ‘relatively’ separate from the 
external world, and indeed, following Luhmann (1995), we see that external world as 
constituted by a myriad of different games/systems. Moreover, the formal system can be a 
curious mixture of real rules and fictional characters creating something that Juul’s (2005) 
describes as ‘half-real’. Is a theory more real than that?  
4. 	
 Endgame: Putting phrónēsis into play (and theory)
One way of integrating some of the above points is to draw on the classical Greek 
distinction between poíēsis and praxis (Dunne, 1993; Kavanagh, 2013).    Poíēsis ‘describes 
an activity associated with making or fabricating something, which necessarily terminates in 
and brings about a separate product or outcome that provides it with its end or 
telos’ (Kavanagh, 2013:109).  In contrast, praxis ‘is not structured around a separately 
identifiable outcome [but] has to do with the conduct of one’s life as a citizen; it is about 
activities such as being friendly, honest, truthful, loyal, helpful. In essence, the distinction 
between poíēsis and praxis  is between productive and ethical activity’ (ibid).  Both domains 
have an associated form of knowledge: téchnē, or productive knowledge, is associated with 
poíēsis, while phrónēsis, or practical wisdom, is the form of knowledge associated with 
praxis.  In the context of games, each game is within the domain of poíēsis, in so far as each 
has its own telos or end.  Phrónēsis is the wisdom that allows us to act ethically within and 
between games, to recognise that bluffing might be acceptable, even valorised, in poker, but 
inappropriate in personal relationships, or to understand the qualitative difference between 
‘killing’ in chess and in real life.   Phrónēsis is also ‘in play’ during game design, as when a 
Polish research institute developed a board game, inspired by Monopoly, that teaches young 
people about life under communism (instead of buying property, players must wait in endless 
queues for scarce goods)7.  Indeed games are always and necessarily infused with phrónēsis 
because phrónēsis the practical wisdom that allows us to know the difference between play 
and not-play, and to understand the complex network of interdependencies between different 
games (each of which is a form of poíēsis) and ‘real’ life.    
Thus, there is no need to ‘put’ phrónēsis into play, since it is a necessary and essential 
part of the phenomenon.  But perhaps we do need to put it into theory, or at least remember 
Theory games	
 15
15
7 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/the-waiting-game-communist-monopoly-teaches-downside-of-socialist-life-a-7
40587.html  
that phrónēsis is an intrinsic to theory and theorizing as it is to games.  This is the central and 
important point made by Bent Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004), who equates phrónēsis with ethics or 
‘deliberation about values with reference to praxis’ (2004: 402). For Flyvbjerg,  ‘the point of 
departure for classical phronetic research can be summarized by the following three value-
rational questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Is this desirable? (3) What should be 
done?’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60). It seems to us that these are important framing questions for 
any piece of social inquiry.
This paper has examined the correspondence between games (and board games in 
particular) and what is commonly understood as theory in the social sciences.  While our 
sense is that games have been marginalised as trivia in contrast to the serious work of 
theorizing, our study indicates how sophisticated, complex and rich games can be in contrast. 
Games have obviously been used in an educational context, but we would argue that games 
can also provide us with a new way of thinking about theory, in much the same way that 
Wittgenstein used games to rethink language.  It is, we think, time to play theory games. 
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Table 1.  The characteristics of theories and board games.
Theories Games
T1. Theories consist of a set of defined constructs, 
‘correspondent with presumed realities’ (Weick 1989: 
517).
G1. Games are epistemologically beyond the 
compass of lists and definitions and can only be 
properly known through playing.
T2. Theories consists of relationships or hypotheses 
that connect the constructs in a meaningful or 
logically resonant way
G2. Games emotionally engage players, giving them 
a meaningful experience and opportunity to express 
themselves. Players engage with games willfully.
T3. Theories have a domain: a field or conceptual 
space within which (as a minimum) the theory 
operates
G3. Games have procedures and rules.
T4. Theories have predictive power. ‘[I]nferences 
may be drawn from it ‘whose truth or falsity can be 
determined by experience’ (Weick 1989: 517).
G4. Games have a material technology, which may 
include components like plastic tokens, boards, dice, 
pens and cards
T5. Theories have a narrative or explanatory power, 
which is convincing to the extent that it matches our 
current understanding. 
G5. Games have an aesthetic, which is every thing to 
do with how the game looks, sounds, feels and plays. 
T6. Theories have utility or relevance: ‘Theorists 
often write trivial theories because their process of 
theory construction is hemmed in by methodological 
strictures that favor validation rather than 
usefulness’ (Lindblom 1987 in Weick 1989: 516).
G6. Games are structured around a problem or goal 
that challenges the players through a structure of 
rewards and penalties. In collaborative games, 
players work together to achieve a collective goal, 
while in competitive games they compete to achieve 
an individualised or team goal.
T7. Theories have an extrinsic telos or ultimate aim. 
Consistent with the idea of theorizing as a practice, 
theorizing also has a purpose, in line with Socrates’ 
assertion that ‘the unexamined life is not worth 
living’.
G7. Games feature chance or risk as an intrinsic 
element. Sometimes, chance is a major part of the 
game (e.g. the lottery), while at the other extreme it 
may be practically absent (e.g. chess).
G8. Games generate stories, that have characters, 
action, plots and other narrative and theatrical 
elements. 
G9. Games have an ethic. They foster a sense of 
community and friendship, and create experiences 
that can change people. Games also have an internal 
value system that may reflect or inform external 
values. 
G10. Games are formal systems, relatively separate 
from the ‘external’ world.
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